because grammar and the lexicon are separate. This view of grammar is oversimplified, however.
Regarding the role of grammatical elements in the lexicon, the   (Chomsky, ) , for example, proposes that lexical, grammatical and abstract features all form part of the lexicon. These elements are then combined by a computational component that builds successively larger structures out of these basic elements. This conception of grammar coincides with Bates & Goodman's claims in the sense that there are grammatical elements, even abstract grammatical elements, in the lexicon. Thus, the fact that  grammatical elements are acquired at the same rate as nongrammatical aspects of the lexicon is consistent with generative grammatical claims.
There is evidence, however, that in addition to lexical grammatical elements, a computational component must exist independently. Such a separation between grammar and lexicon is motivated, in the case of child language acquisition, by the fact that while elements of the lexicon are acquired gradually, constraints on the computational component are obeyed from the very beginning. An example of such an apparently universal constraint on syntax is called   (Rizzi, ) . What it means is that in any structure, elements of the same ' flavour ' cannot move over one another. In (), for instance, we have a structure with two auxiliary verbs. Rizzi pointed out that in this structure, a question can be formed from a. by moving the uppermost auxiliary, as in b., but not by moving the lowermost auxiliary, as in c. He suggested that this followed from a general principle that restricts the way syntactic elements can move. This principle turns out to hold of many different kinds of syntactic elements in many different languages (cf. Chomsky Analogous to the strict ordering constraints on auxiliaries in English, there are also strict ordering constraints in Spanish and Catalan on the order of verbs, clitics and negation ; these dictate one pattern for imperatives and another pattern for non-imperatives. These patterns are argued by Rivero & Terzi () to follow from this same principle of relativized minimality. It turns out that child Spanish and Catalan speakers respect relativized minimality's prohibition on certain syntactic patterns in negative commands, even before children have the grammatical tools necessary to produce adultlike negative commands. Thus, a core principle of grammar develops before one of the constructions it regulates is produced in child language. I take this disjunction to be relevant to Bates & Goodman's claim and also to be very much unrefuted by their evidence.
Thus, there is an early stage of child Catalan and Spanish in which children have not yet learned subjunctive morphology, which is necessary for producing negative commands, such as those given in () and ()." What children seem to do in the absence of the adult-like means to express negative commands is to simply say ' not ' (no) and are prevented from giving further grammatical form to their intention. Notice that this leaves a gap in the child's communicative repertoire in that they cannot specify the proposition they wish to negate. Significantly, at this same time children are able to use negation with declarative sentences, as in () & (), and are able to use affirmative imperatives, as in () & (). Thus, there is no general problem with using [] To be clear, this early stage is defined by the absence of subjunctive morphology. The stages for the seven children considered are as follows : Table  , that in adult Catalan and Spanish the verb always follows negation and the clitic in interrogatives, declaratives and negative commands. The affirmative imperative is the only construction in which the verb precedes the clitic (negation, as we have pointed out descriptively, does not occur in imperatives). One possible way for children to respond to this dilemma, then, would be to place negative command verbs in the same place that affirmative imperative verbs belong, perhaps following some kind of ' semantic analogy ' based on the fact that both negative commands and affirmative imperatives include a kind of ' command ' illocutionary force. Were children to make this functionally motivated learning step, they would produce the ungrammatical syntactic pattern schematized in the last row of Table  , illustrated in () and (). So, why should children not produce the pattern instantiated in () and ()? Producing such a form would make it possible for children to produce a kind of negative command, which is otherwise unavailable to them at this stage, increasing children's ability to meet their ' communicative needs '. Furthermore, placing the verb before the clitic in this way would follow a kind of ' syntactic analogy ' by reproducing the syntactic pattern instantiated by affirmative imperatives with clitics. This is what one might expect if one believed that general learning mechanisms like analogy have something to do with grammar emerging. In fact, in such a framework one might expect that children should produce exactly the forms in () and (). Well, looking instead to relatively well understood properties of Universal Grammar, such as relativized minimality, for an explanation for why children fail to produce forms like () and (), we conclude that children fail to produce these forms for the same reasons that adults fail to produce them, namely : to do so would violate relativized minimality. It is important for researchers studying language learning to remember that what children do not produce is as important as what they do produce. We know that children do not fail to produce utterances like () and () simply because they have not heard them before because children produce many utterances that they have never heard before. If, however, contra the emergentist view, we attribute a priori knowledge of the principle of relativized minimality to children, then we can explain how sharply reduced the problem space is for the language learning task, why the child language errors we find constitute such a narrow class and why some errors never occur at all.
Returning to relativized minimality, how does this principle block the ungrammatical cases in () and () ? In summary (for more details see Grinstead, ), imperative verbs are argued to raise to a high position in the clause, based on evidence from clitic position (Rivero & Terzi, ) . The imperative verb, because it is a clausal head, is argued to move one step at a time through the clause, up to this high position. It is blocked from moving in this way when a negative element intervenes, however, because negation is a logical operator in the same way that an imperative verb is a logical operator, i.e. they both carry a kind of illocutionary force. Thus, the imperative cannot move over negation, as in (), because they are of the same ' flavour ', informally speaking, which is ruled out by relativized minimality.
() Imperative movement to C blocked by intervening negation
* * * Thus, relativized minimality appears to constrain the formation of negative commands, even before the lexicon has developed to include the subjunctive morphology necessary to produce the adult negative command construction. This disjunction is a counter-example to Bates & Goodman's central contention that grammar and the lexicon develop simultaneously. To reiterate, there is no gradual, developmental curve in the effectiveness of relativized minimality, given the complete absence of examples like () or (). This constraint on verb movement is simply obeyed in every instance. This is because like other principles of Universal Grammar, it could not plausibly have arisen from the lexicon. The implausibility of children ' learning ' such abstract principles is the foundation of the poverty of the stimulus argument, upon which generative linguistic theory is based. To close, Bates & Goodman show a simultaneity of development of lexical and grammatical elements, which, given the status of the lexicon in current work in generative syntax, is completely consistent with the theory. Furthermore, when fundamental principles of the computational component of grammar, such as relativized minimality, are examined we find that they are in effect from the very earliest point at which we can detect them. More specifically, before the child Spanish and Catalan lexicons develop to the place where subjunctive morphology is actively used, relativized minimality restricts the possible alternative constructions children can use in its place. Thus the computational component of grammar is active and adult-like before grammatical elements in the lexicon develop. This ' guiding ' characteristic of a constraint on the computational component distinguishes it dramatically from the more lexically bound aspects of grammar the authors  consider. Evidence of this kind suggests that the ' nature of nature ' is much as it has been argued to be by nativists for quite some time and thus calls into question any definition of ' emergence ' that ignores the computational component of grammar.
